The History of Rhodesia

 

 

To clear up the fact that there was representation for all blacks - even if there were not on the voting register (due to either lack of interest or demographics) I shall explain the national chiefs council. A diagram may help

The orginal Rhoesian constution of 1923 gave no racial basis to eligibility for voting - the poll was open to everyone from each race and creed. In 1961 the constuation was changed to an A and B poll. The first poll was open to everyone (whites and blacks) - the B roll with with a 'debased franchise' (Bitter Harvest) which meant that only blacks would be lected through it.

There were fifty 'A' roll seats in the Rhodesian parliament. In the 1960's, in order to secure native African representation, a 'B' roll was created which had a total of seventeen seats.

PM Ian Smith explained that this constiatuoon was the most favourable to take into account that the vast majority of black Rhodesians had no experience with the democratic system. It is true that white Rhodesians feared that a very rapid transition to black rule might lead to the distaaster that were occuring in other mewly independent Black African states such as Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, and Nigeria. Ian therefore proposed a gradual inclusion of Blacks - increasing as the African population got to understand the system.

Immediately after UDI Britain decided not to to respond to the UDI with force (there is widespread debate that their was no heart in such an operation within the British miliraty. So britian attempting economic tactics such as ending the link between sterling and the Rhodesian Pound and seizing assets. The British refused to pay pensiorers living in Rhodesia (so Ian Smith paid them instead) and in turn Rhodesia defaulted on all the loans from the British Government. In the weeks after the British broadsheets carried headlines (from the government) that UDI would be over in weeks. Britain soon imposed an oil embargo to encourage it's erragnt child back to the fold - unfortunely the errant child had grown into a man and he had his own ideas now.

The British Government, under pressure from the the OAU, were pushing for a swift settlement on their terms, regardless of whether it was the right choice for Rhodesia or not. No discussion or amendments were allowed and the Rhodesian delegation were expected to sign on the spot, without even consulting with parliament back in Salisbury. Of course, with Ian Smith at the helm - the answer was no.

Another meeting between the British and Rhodesian governments took place during 1968 on board HMS Fearless, again in Gibraltar, with much the same results. The British government still desperately wanted to push through a deal which was acceptable to the OAU, not a deal which was necessarily in the best interests of Rhodesia.

The United Nations imposed economic sanctions in 1968, but these were only partly successful; some strategic minerals, especially chromium, were exported to willing buyers in Europe and North America, further strengthening the economy.

Unsuccessful negotiations with Britain continued. A 1971 proposal to lessen restrictions on the opposition led to the creation of a third nationalist movement, the United African National Council (UANC), led by the Methodist bishop Abel Muzorewa. Unlike ZAPU and ZANU—both banned and operating only from exile in Zambia and Mozambique, respectively—UANC was able to organize inside Rhodesia and held talks with the government during the 1970s. During the early 1970s ZAPU and ZANU had sporadically organized raids into Rhodesia, but in December 1972 the violence of the conflict intensified after a ZANU attack in the northeast. The Zambia-Rhodesia border was closed in 1973, but Mozambican independence in 1975 provided a valuable base of operations for ZANU, which had close links to the Frelimo government.

The Rhodesian government was thus under diplomatic, military, and, increasingly, economic pressure for a settlement. The 1976 rapprochement between Nkomo and Mugabe led to the formation of the Patriotic Front (PF), which received frontline support from Rhodesia's majority-ruled neighbours. The fighting escalated in both area and intensity, and the emergency measures adopted by the government to counter it also served to increase antigovernment feeling.

By 1979 the combination of pressures had forced Smith to accept the necessity of an “internal settlement.”